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ABSTRACT. Essentially all guidelines and regulations require that biomedical 
research studies have an acceptable risk-benefit profile. However, these documents 
offer little concrete guidance for implementing this requirement and determining 
when it is satisfied. As a result, those charged with risk-benefit evaluations cur-
rently assess the risk-benefit profile of biomedical research studies in unsystematic 
ways, raising concern that some research participants are not being protected from 
excessive risks and that some valuable studies involving acceptable risk are being 
rejected. The present paper aims to address this situation by delineating the first 
comprehensive framework, which is based on existing guidelines and regulations as 
well as the relevant literature, for risk-benefit evaluations in biomedical research. 
One of the key ethical requirements for biomedical research is that it have an acceptable risk-benefit profile (Emanuel, Wendler, and Grady 2000). The International Conference of Harmonization 
guidelines mandate that clinical trials should be initiated and continued 
only if “the anticipated benefits justify the risks” (1996). Guidelines from 
the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences state that 
biomedical research is acceptable only if the “potential benefits and risks 
are reasonably balanced” (2002). U.S. federal regulations require that the 
“risks to subjects” be “reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if 
any, to subjects and the importance of the knowledge” to be gained from 
the study (HHS 1991). 
These requirements provide a general principle for risk-benefit evalu-
ations. However, they offer little concrete guidance on how to make the 
judgments that they mandate. This lack of detailed guidance is hardly 
surprising; guidelines and regulatory documents need to address a broad 
range of issues in a reasonably concise way. However, the paucity of con-
crete guidance leads investigators, sponsors, and members of institutional 
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review boards (IRBs) and research ethics committees (RECs) to evaluate 
the risks and potential benefits of biomedical research in unsystematic 
ways, often based on little more than intuition alone. In one of the few 
empirical studies to investigate how IRB/REC members evaluate research 
risks and potential benefits, only 6 of 53 reviewers indicated that they use 
a systematic approach (van Luijn et al. 2002). 
While intuition plays an important role in risk-benefit evaluations, reli-
ance on mere intuition—attempting to determine the risk-benefit profile 
of procedures and studies based simply on how risky and beneficial they 
seem, without any appeal to intervening steps, analysis, or empirical 
data—increases the chances for mistakes. Indeed, empirical studies have 
found significant variation in how IRBs/RECs evaluate research risks and 
potential benefits (van Luijn et al. 2006; Shah et al. 2004; Lenk et al. 2004). 
These data raise concern that some participants are not being protected 
from excessive risks and that valuable studies involving acceptable risk 
are being rejected—or not even submitted given the uncertain outcomes 
of ethical review. 
In recent years, scholars in bioethics have made significant progress 
in clarifying some of the key concepts relevant to making risk-benefit 
evaluations. There has been intense discussion over how to evaluate the 
risk-benefit profile of so-called therapeutic procedures and what role, 
if any, “clinical equipoise” should play in this process (Gifford 2007; 
London 2007; Miller and Brody 2003, 2007; Miller and Weijer 2007; 
Veatch 2007; Wendler and Miller 2007; Weijer and Miller 2004; Rid and 
Wendler 2010). The concept of “minimal risk,” especially in the context 
of pediatric research, has sparked significant debate (Ross and Nelson 
2006; Kopelman 2004; Wendler 2005; Resnik 2005; Freedman, Fuks, and 
Weijer 1993). Commentators have also explored whether there should 
be any upper limits on the research risks to which competent consenting 
adults may be exposed (Miller and Joffe 2009). 
Although this literature has greatly improved our understanding, it 
focuses largely on specific aspects of risk-benefit evaluations. Lacking 
is a comprehensive framework that integrates these advances and offers 
practicable, step-by-step guidance for investigators, IRB/REC members, 
sponsors, and others charged with evaluating the risks and potential ben-
efits of biomedical research studies. The present paper aims to close this 
gap in the literature by delineating a systematic framework for risk-benefit 
evaluations based on the relevant literature and on existing guidelines and 
regulations (National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects 
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of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1979; World Medical Association 
2008; Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences 2002; 
International Conference of Harmonization 1996; Council of Europe 
2005; HHS 1991).1 
THE CHALLENGE OF EVALUATING RESEARCH  
RISKS ANd POTENTIAL BENEFITS
Consider a phase 2 study to test the efficacy of an investigational treat-
ment for liver cancer. Laboratory data suggest that the investigational 
treatment may reduce tumor size more than existing treatments. However, 
both the investigational treatment and the procedures that are scientifi-
cally necessary for evaluating it—a series of blood draws, a CT scan, and 
a liver biopsy—pose risks to participants. 
According to current ethical and legal guidance, this study should be 
approved only if investigators, sponsors, and IRBs/RECs determine that 
the risks are reasonable in relation to the potential benefits for participants 
and/or for society. Making this determination is challenging. It requires 
methodological evaluation as to whether the chosen methods are scientifi-
cally sound and so are capable of generating socially valuable results and 
whether the included research interventions are necessary for addressing 
the study question(s). It requires empirical judgment about how robust 
and relevant the available data are regarding the potential harms and 
benefits of the interventions. And it requires normative evaluation of the 
magnitude of the potential harms to participants, should they occur, and 
of how much value the collected data would have for society. Furthermore, 
risk-benefit evaluations go beyond a direct assessment and weighing of 
risks and potential benefits. Efforts to reasonably reduce the risks to re-
search participants and to enhance the potential benefits for them and for 
society are typically seen as part of the evaluation process. Moreover, the 
risks and potential benefits of so-called therapeutic research interventions 
need to be evaluated in comparison to alternative treatments, if there are 
any. Hence, while the term “risk-benefit evaluation,” strictly understood, 
refers to absolute judgments about risks and potential benefits, risk-benefit 
evaluations in biomedical research have complex comparative and nor-
mative aspects.2 Given the number and complexity of these judgments, 
concern that unsystematic approaches to risk-benefit evaluations may lead 
to inconsistent, incomplete, and sometimes mistaken results is warranted. 
The proposed framework for risk-benefit evaluations (see table) is 
intended to be one part of a broader ethical framework for biomedical 
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research (Emanuel, Wendler, and Grady 2000). The proposal describes 
steps for evaluating the risks and potential benefits of research studies, not 
algorithms or decision rules that yield one and only one verdict about the 
risk-benefit profile of each possible protocol. The framework thus draws 
on intuition and normative judgment while clarifying and guiding—based 
on current understanding—the role played by intuition. Our hope is that 
this guidance will assist investigators, IRBs/RECs, sponsors, and others 
who need to make these difficult judgments, helping to improve both the 
accuracy and the consistency of risk-benefit evaluations in biomedical 
research. 
The proposed framework is based on several normative assumptions. 
The most fundamental is that biomedical research studies are ethical only 
if they have a reasonable risk-benefit ratio. We further assume that research 
is acceptable only if it has at least some social value. These assumptions 
seem plausible and are widely endorsed by existing guidelines and regula-
tions. Nonetheless, commentators have questioned either or both of these 
assumptions (Wertheimer 2010; Sachs 2010; Rajczi 2004), and we do not 
attempt to respond to their arguments here. 
Furthermore, the reasons why one thinks that a reasonable risk-benefit 
ratio is required for ethical research will have implications for how one 
thinks these evaluations should be conducted. For example, some com-
mentators argue that the requirement of a reasonable risk-benefit ratio 
is justified on paternalistic grounds: it helps to ensure that participants’ 
interests are protected given widespread decisional impairments in the 
research context (Miller and Wertheimer 2007). One implication of this 
view is that payment for research participation should be treated no dif-
ferently in the risk-benefit evaluation than any clinical benefits participants 
might realize (Wertheimer 2010). 
Our own view—which remains to be fully developed—is that the jus-
tification for risk-benefit evaluations goes beyond protecting the interests 
of research participants. The requirement for a reasonable risk-benefit 
ratio is justified for other reasons as well, including the need to protect 
the professional integrity of physician-investigators, to maintain public 
confidence in the research endeavor, and to ensure that societal gains in 
health and well-being are not won at the cost of exploiting even competent 
participants who agree to be exploited. Although we cannot provide a full 
defense of this view here, it informs the framework we propose.
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A SEVEN-STEP FRAMEWORK FOR RISK-BENEFIT EVALUATIONS
Step 1: Ensure and Enhance the Study’s Social Value
Risk-benefit evaluations often begin with an evaluation of the risks 
posed by the study. However, the proper first step is to ensure that the 
proposed study achieves a minimum level of social value. Studies without 
any social value cannot justify exposing participants to risks, no matter 
how low (Emanuel, Wendler, and Grady 2000). Hence, they can be rejected 
without further evaluation.
despite its fundamental importance for ethical research, social value 
remains an underexplored concept. Socially valuable studies should col-
lect data that are methodologically sound and address an important and 
unresolved scientific or clinical problem. Yet scientific value is rarely seen 
as a sufficient condition for social value. Reviewers also need to ensure that 
the information to be collected will provide at least a minimum amount 
of potential social benefit. In addition to evaluating the overall potential 
benefits of the study, reviewers should consider how those benefits will be 
distributed. For example, assuming the liver cancer study is scientifically 
sound, it is socially valuable because it addresses a serious disease affect-
ing some of the worst-off patients (e.g., patients with chronic hepatitis 
and alcoholics), who could gain significantly from the new drug given 
the limitations of existing alternative treatments. Unfortunately, there 
currently are no clear criteria for evaluating whether a study passes the 
threshold for social value. Reviewers should therefore determine that the 
study has social value sufficient to justify exposing participants to at least 
some risks.3 Importantly, the presence of social value does not depend on 
positive study results. For example, showing that the investigational liver 
cancer drug lacks in clinical effect is socially valuable because it prevents 
future patients from being exposed to unnecessary risks and may yield 
important insights into new options for future investigation (e.g., novel 
mechanisms of drug action). 
determining that a study achieves a minimum level of social value re-
quires detailed knowledge of the research topic, as well as knowledge of 
the scientific methods proposed in the study. Ideally, the scientific merits 
of a study have been assessed before the protocol is passed on to ethical 
review boards. For example, to obtain funding from the U.S. govern-
ment, study protocols must undergo stringent scientific review prior to 
being reviewed by an IRB/REC. However, prior scientific review does not 
always occur. In this situation, when reviewers do not have the expertise 
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necessary for evaluating a study’s potential social benefits, they need to 
acknowledge their limitations and call on ad hoc committee members or 
expert consultants. 
Once it has been determined that the proposed study reaches the thresh-
old with respect to social value, ways should be considered to enhance 
its value. For example, the biopsy specimens from the liver cancer study 
could be made available for future research and thus increase the value 
of participants’ contributions. Reviewers should recognize, however, that 
some ways of enhancing social value might increase the risks to partici-
pants, decrease the overall feasibility of the study, or require modifications 
of the study protocol. Storing specimens for future research, for instance, 
can be costly and requires adapting provisions for the consent process 
accordingly. Similarly, adding one or two additional passes to the liver 
biopsy yields more tissue for scientific testing but may increase the risks 
to participants. Reviewers should carefully consider how to balance these 
potentially competing considerations.
Step 2: Identify the Research Interventions
The second step is to identify the research interventions, as well as any 
procedures to be used for ensuring the safety of those interventions. Any 
treatments that are standard of care for the population in question need 
not be evaluated, unless the study context might alter their risk-benefit 
profile. In the liver cancer study, for example, the blood draws, CT scan, 
and liver biopsy are performed to test the safety and efficacy of the inves-
tigational cancer drug, and an ultrasound is necessary to safely guide the 
liver biopsy. All of these procedures qualify as research interventions. By 
contrast, the diuretics or beta-blockers that might be provided to treat 
participants’ ascites or portal hypertension are not research interventions. 
Reviewers need to evaluate the risk-benefit profile of these medications 
only if the available data suggest that the research interventions may alter 
their typical risk-benefit profile. The investigational liver cancer drug, for 
instance, might reduce kidney function and thus decrease the clinical ben-
efits of diuretics. This second step of identifying the research interventions 
is necessary for delimiting the scope of risk-benefit evaluations. It is also 
important because global judgments of the risk-benefit profile of a study 
as a whole may miss concerns raised by individual interventions within 
the study and are more likely to be inaccurate.
Research interventions must have the potential to yield important and 
nonduplicative information. Procedures that do not provide important 
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information pose risks for no potential social benefit and should be elimi-
nated from the protocol. Furthermore, research interventions should help 
address the main scientific question(s) posed by the study. This does not 
preclude the possibility of allowing a small number of tangential research 
interventions that are relevant for addressing other issues, in particular 
if they are low risk. For example, investigators in the liver cancer study 
might propose to add a MRI scan of the head in order to investigate the 
early pathophysiology of liver encephalopathy. While the scan might yield 
important scientific information, it is not relevant to testing the safety and 
efficacy of the investigational cancer drug. Instead, the scan is a tangential 
research intervention that addresses a new study question. Allowing inves-
tigators to add a few tangential procedures can increase the efficiency of 
biomedical research. However, reviewers should be wary of studies that 
include a high number of such interventions, as well as riskier procedures 
that collect information on issues not directly related to the study’s main 
scientific question(s). They should thus carefully scrutinize the risks of any 
tangential research interventions in the following step (step 3). 
Prominent approaches to risk-benefit assessment classify the identi-
fied research interventions into two subgroups: (1) therapeutic interven-
tions, such as the investigational drug in the liver cancer study, that are 
administered with therapeutic intent or warrant,, and (2) nontherapeutic 
interventions, such as the blood draws, CT scan, and the liver biopsy 
in that study, that are administered solely for the purpose of answering 
scientific questions (Weijer 2000; London 2007). According to these ap-
proaches, distinct ethical requirements apply to each group of research 
interventions. For example, “component analysis” requires that the risks 
of therapeutic research interventions be justified by their potential clinical 
benefits, whereas the risks of nontherapeutic interventions are justified by 
the knowledge that is expected to be gained from including those proce-
dures in the study (Weijer and Miller 2004).
These approaches to risk-benefit evaluation are problematic. To begin 
with, the distinction between therapeutic and nontherapeutic interven-
tions is not clear. An investigational drug in phase 1 testing, for example, 
is not administered with therapeutic intent and thus seems to be a clear 
example of a nontherapeutic intervention. After all, phase 1 trials evalu-
ate drug safety, not efficacy. However, available data suggest that phase 
1 drugs in oncology offer a prospect of direct clinical benefit for study 
participants (Miller and Joffe 2008). Thus, it would not be unreasonable 
for investigators to offer these drugs with therapeutic intent or warrant. 
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It is therefore unclear whether phase 1 oncological drugs are therapeutic 
or nontherapeutic procedures. 
Even if the distinction between therapeutic and nontherapeutic interven-
tions could be clarified, it is not morally relevant for evaluating the risks 
and potential benefits of research interventions (Wendler and Miller 2007). 
The goal of risk-benefit evaluations is to ensure that research interventions 
and studies do not expose participants to excessive risks of harm for the 
benefit of others. Whether a given level of research risk is excessive depends 
on the magnitude of the risks, the level of corresponding potential benefits 
for the participant, if any, and the level of potential social benefit from 
performing the intervention and the study. It does not depend on whether 
the risks result from a therapeutic or a nontherapeutic intervention. 
The fundamental problem with different ethical requirements for thera-
peutic and nontherapeutic interventions is that they introduce different 
thresholds of acceptable net risk in biomedical research and thereby render 
risk-benefit evaluations incoherent. For example, “component analysis” 
allows competent participants to consent to sometimes significant risks 
without any compensating potential clinical benefits, as long as the risks 
result from a nontherapeutic intervention (e.g., a liver biopsy performed 
for research purposes only). Yet it does not allow competent participants 
to consent to risks, even if they are outweighed by compensating potential 
clinical benefits, if the risks result from a therapeutic intervention with 
a less favorable risk-benefit profile than available alternative treatments 
(e.g., a slightly less effective, first-generation liver cancer drug in a trial 
comparing the effectiveness of first- and second-generation treatments). 
Given that the main ethical concern about biomedical research is that 
participants are being exposed to excessive risks for the benefit of oth-
ers, it is incoherent to allow significant net risks to participants for some 
research interventions but not for others. It follows that the risks of all 
research interventions in a study should be evaluated according to uniform 
ethical criteria.4 
Step 3: Evaluate and Reduce the Risks to Participants
The third step is to evaluate and reasonably reduce or minimize the 
risks that the individual research interventions in the study, as well as any 
procedures necessary for ensuring their safety, pose to participants.5 Risks 
are a function of two more basic components: (1) the likelihood that a 
harmful event or experience will occur as a result of an intervention, and 
(2) the extent to which the event or experience, should it occur, sets back 
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the individual participant’s interests. For example, the liver biopsy in the 
liver cancer study poses a 160–733 per 100,000 risk of hemorrhage with 
hypotension or decrease in hemoglobin concentration that requires trans-
fusion and/or other supportive measures, which might be considered a 
moderate setback to participants’ interests. Risk evaluations thus require 
an empirical judgment about how likely different harms are to result 
from the given intervention and a normative evaluation of the magnitude 
of the respective harms, should they occur (Rid, Emanuel, and Wendler 
2010). Reviewers should consider potential harms of all types—physical, 
psychological, social, and economic (Levine 1986)—and all degrees.
To implement this step properly, it is important to be clear regarding 
its goal. Research regulations focus on evaluating and reducing the risks 
that research interventions pose to participants. However, the ultimate 
goal of risk-benefit evaluations is not to protect participants from risks. 
The goal is to reduce the extent to which participants experience harm 
from participating in a research study.6 Unfortunately, we rarely are in 
a position to know whether a given research procedure—for example, 
ingestion of the investigational liver cancer drug—will harm participants. 
Typically, the only way we can reduce harms to participants is to focus on 
and reduce the risks of harm. Recognizing that risk-benefit evaluations aim 
to reduce harms, not risks, is important for avoiding a common mistake. 
Some commentators argue that “mere” inconvenience, burden, discom-
fort, or embarrassment should be excluded from risk-benefit evaluations 
(Levine 1986; Prentice and Gordon 2001). There are two possible grounds 
for this view. First, one might argue that mere inconveniences do not 
constitute a sufficient setback to participants’ interests to be of concern. 
However, this argument ignores the possibility that a sufficient number 
of inconveniences incurred in a study could result in considerable harm, 
either as a result of additive or synergistic effects. Second, one might argue 
that “mere” inconveniences should be excluded because the requirement 
is to reduce risks, not harms that are certain to occur. For example, the 
inconvenience of undergoing a liver ultrasound is not a risk because it is a 
certainty for all participants. However, this argument misses the fact that the 
ultimate goal of the requirement to reduce risks is to reduce harms. When 
harms can be reduced directly, for example by excluding an unnecessary 
liver ultrasound from a study, this should be done as part of the present step.
Several considerations are relevant to ensuring that the risks to par-
ticipants are reasonably reduced. Reviewers should eliminate research 
interventions that do not provide important and nonduplicative informa-
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tion (see step 2). Conversely, it can be appropriate to require inclusion of 
additional procedures to improve the safety of research interventions. In 
the liver cancer study, for example, the liver biopsy should be performed 
under ultrasound guidance to reduce the risk of bleeding and perforation 
of adjacent organs (e.g., gall bladder or colon). Reviewers should also 
probe whether relevant information can be gathered with interventions 
that are less risky than those proposed in the protocol. For instance, a MRI 
scan might be sufficient to evaluate the effects of the investigational liver 
cancer drug, and it would avoid the radiation exposure of a CT scan; the 
liver biopsy could be obtained as part of a clinically indicated procedure 
or investigators might be able to perform the necessary laboratory tests 
on existing specimens or blood samples; and so on. 
Particular scrutiny should be given to the risks of any interventions that 
are not directly related to addressing the main study question(s). These 
tangential research procedures can be appropriate provided the risks are 
sufficiently low. For example, it would be acceptable to add a short ques-
tionnaire investigating the “therapeutic misconception” for phase 2 study 
participants to the liver cancer study. do participants understand that 
the defining purpose of the study is to produce generalizable knowledge, 
regardless of whether they may personally benefit from the study? While 
adding such a questionnaire seems appropriate, it would not be acceptable 
to add a brain biopsy in order to investigate the early pathophysiology of 
liver encephalopathy. In addition, the overall number of tangential research 
interventions should not represent an excessive burden on participants. 
Adding a few tangential procedures can be appropriate, depending on 
the length of the study, but adding dozens of these interventions is not. 
Reviewers need to ensure that a few individual participants do not dis-
proportionately bear the risks and burdens of biomedical research. Thus, 
they should eliminate any tangential interventions that pose high risks 
and also eliminate some if they are excessive in number. Finally, review-
ers should consider modifying the study’s inclusion/exclusion criteria to 
exclude participant groups who are at increased risk of being harmed. In 
the liver cancer study, for instance, excluding patients with highly vas-
cularized cancers who have a high risk of bleeding from the liver biopsy 
might be justified.
Three considerations are important when evaluating and reducing the 
risks to participants. First, past experience with a research intervention is 
needed to determine what harms might result from it and to estimate how 
likely the harms are to occur. Yet data regarding the impact of research in-
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terventions are often limited (Rid and Wendler, forthcoming). For example, 
a significant part of the available data on the risks of liver biopsy was col-
lected at a time when biopsies were performed without ultrasound guidance. 
Reviewers must therefore carefully evaluate the strength of the available 
evidence, as well as its relevance for the study context under consideration. 
In the case of investigational drugs, reviewers should also consider whether 
experience with similar interventions might provide relevant evidence and 
judge the possible need for further preliminary research. To evaluate the 
risks of the investigational liver cancer drug, for example, reviewers might 
consult data on treatments that work through similar pathways.
While assessing the available evidence can be difficult and always re-
quires judgment, taking existing data into account is better than relying 
on intuition alone. Extensive research from psychology shows that intui-
tive risk judgments are often biased (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Slovic 
1987; Weinstein 1989). For example, we perceive familiar risks, such as 
the risk of driving, to be less risky than they really are. Consideration 
of the available data mitigates the impact of biases and results in more 
informed and accurate judgments about research risks (Rid, Emanuel, 
and Wendler 2010).
Second, the risks of research interventions depend on who will undergo 
them, yet risk evaluations have to be made before the study begins. Re-
viewers must therefore use the study’s inclusion and exclusion criteria 
to estimate and evaluate the risks to the average participant expected to 
enroll in the study. Unfortunately, determination that the risks of a re-
search intervention are acceptable for the average prospective participant 
cannot preclude the possibility that the risks will be excessive for some 
individuals who are eligible to enroll in the study. Although this outcome 
is unavoidable, reviewers might sometimes require that investigators evalu-
ate specific individuals prior to enrollment who predictably face excessive 
risks. For example, prospective participants in the liver cancer study might 
be asked to undergo a liver ultrasound if they suffer from a vascularized 
liver cancer, which increases the risk of bleeding from a liver biopsy. If 
an entire subgroup of prospective participants faces excessive risks, the 
study’s inclusion/exclusion criteria should be revised to exclude this group. 
Third, measures to reduce research risks can be costly, undermine the 
scientific validity of a study by overly limiting the data that can be collected, 
and compromise fair subject selection by denying some subpopulations the 
potential benefits of research. When delineating steps to reasonably reduce 
risks, reviewers should carefully balance these competing considerations. 
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In general, reviewers should focus on reducing serious risks. Significantly 
fewer trade-offs should be accepted to reduce risks that are very unlikely 
to occur, such as a 3 per 100,000 risk of a superficial kidney puncture 
from a liver biopsy or that involve harms of very low magnitude, such as 
the risk of getting a small bruise from a blood draw. 
Step 4: Evaluate and Enhance the Potential Benefits for Participants
The fourth step is to evaluate and enhance the potential clinical benefits 
that the individual research interventions in the study offer participants. 
Importantly, this step requires judging both the likelihood and the magni-
tude of potential clinical benefits. Without this judgment, it is impossible 
to evaluate whether the level of potential clinical benefit of an intervention 
justifies the risks that it poses.7 
The considerations relevant to this step are similar to those regarding the 
evaluation and reduction of risks. First, the data necessary for identifying 
the potential clinical benefits of the research interventions are often limited 
and thus require careful evaluation. Second, potential clinical benefits must 
be evaluated from the perspective of the average prospective participant, 
which implies that the potential clinical benefits may not apply to some 
individuals. Reviewers should consider adjusting the inclusion/exclusion 
criteria to focus the study on those participants for whom study participa-
tion would be most beneficial. Third, the wisdom of measures to enhance 
potential clinical benefits should be evaluated in light of their impact on 
costs, scientific validity, and fair subject selection. 
While this step’s exclusive focus on the potential clinical benefits of re-
search interventions is consistent with current ethical and legal guidance, 
as well as common wisdom in bioethics (Macklin 1989; King 2000), this 
approach is not universally endorsed. Some commentators have argued 
that reviewers should factor the potential economic, social, or psycho-
logical benefits participants might realize during the study—for example, 
payment, praise, or feelings of altruism—in the risk-benefit calculus for 
a study (Sachs 2010; Wertheimer 2010; Jansen 2009). We return to this 
question.
Step 5: Evaluate Whether the Interventions Pose Net Risks
Some research interventions offer participants a prospect of clinical 
benefit such that the risks of undergoing the intervention are offset by the 
potential clinical benefits. For example, the risks of the investigational liver 
cancer drug might be outweighed by its potential to significantly reduce 
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tumor size. These interventions are the “win-win” cases in risk-benefit 
evaluations: they promote participants’ clinical or health interests and 
they allow investigators to gather generalizable knowledge for the benefit 
of future patients. These interventions raise concern only to the extent 
that they promote participants’ clinical interests to a lesser degree than 
available alternative treatments.8 
By contrast, some research interventions offer participants little or no 
prospect of clinical benefit. These interventions pose “net risks”—risks of 
harm that are not, or not entirely, offset or outweighed by the potential 
clinical benefits for participants. If these risks are justified, they are justified 
by the social value of the information to be gained from the study. The key 
task of reviewers is to ensure that these net risks are not excessive. Thus, 
one of the most critical steps in risk-benefit evaluations is to separate the 
risks that participants assume for their own potential clinical benefit from 
the risks that they assume solely for the benefit of future patients. The 
fifth step therefore is to determine whether any of the individual research 
interventions in the study pose such net risks to participants. 
Reviewers should consider three types of net risk, absolute, relative, and 
indirect. Absolute net risks arise when the risks of an intervention are not 
outweighed by the intervention’s potential clinical benefits. Absolute net 
risks are pure when the research intervention poses risks without offering 
any potential clinical benefits for participants. This situation obtains in 
research interventions that offer no potential for direct clinical benefit to 
subjects—such as the liver biopsy in the liver cancer study, which serves 
to evaluate the efficacy of the investigational cancer drug but has no bear-
ing on participants’ clinical care. Research on healthy volunteers equally 
poses pure absolute net risks. 
Absolute net risks are impure when a research intervention offers po-
tential clinical benefits for participants but the benefits do not outweigh 
the risks. For example, research interventions that are not part of regular 
clinical care but nonetheless offer some prospect of clinical benefit can 
pose impure absolute net risks. For instance, the liver biopsy in the liver 
cancer study might offer some additional information for cancer staging 
that would generally not be obtainable in the clinical setting. However, 
the benefits of this information typically will not be important enough to 
outweigh the signficant risks of the biopsy. If the benefits did justify the 
risks, the biopsy would likely be part of standard medical care.
Relative net risks arise when the risks of a research intervention are 
outweighed by its potential clinical benefits but the intervention’s risk-
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benefit profile is less favorable than the risk-benefit profile of one or more 
available alternative treatments or diagnostic procedures. For example, 
investigators might propose a randomized-controlled trial to compare 
the effectiveness of a relatively inexpensive first-generation drug for liver 
cancer with an expensive second-generation drug (this assumes that the 
two treatments have not been tested head to head). The risks of the first-
generation drug are outweighed by its potential clinical benefits, hence the 
drug does not pose absolute net risks. However, the first-generation drug 
poses relative net risks because its risk-benefit profile is in all likelihood 
less favorable than the risk-benefit profile of the second-generation drug.9 
Indirect net risks arise when a research intervention itself has a favorable 
risk-benefit profile but the intervention diminishes the typical risk-benefit 
profile of other research or clinical procedures provided as part of or in 
parallel to the study. For example, the investigational drug in the liver 
cancer study might alter the risk-benefit profile of diuretics, a standard 
treatment for the ascites frequently associated with advanced liver cancer. 
Net-risk determinations require weighing the risks of a research inter-
vention against the intervention’s potential clinical benefits and sometimes 
will call for comparing the risk–benefit profile of the intervention to the 
risk-benefit profiles of established alternative treatments or diagnostic 
procedures. Some commentators argue that such determinations are 
impossible to make because the risks and potential benefits of an inter-
vention often affect different domains of health and thus lack a basis for 
comparison (Martin et al. 1995). The concepts of harm and benefit and 
their commensurability or comparability clearly raise deep philosophical 
issues. From a practical perspective, however, it is important to note that 
clinicians routinely make similar evaluations in the context of clinical 
care. To decide whether to recommend a particular treatment, clinicians 
consider whether the potential clinical benefits of the treatment (which 
might occur in one domain of health) outweigh the risks (which might 
be relevant to a different domain) in comparison to available alternative 
interventions, if any, and thus promote the patient’s clinical interests. As 
part of this deliberation, clinicians carefully consider the available clinical 
data, as well as the opinion of patients and the expert professional com-
munity regarding the treatments under consideration. 
Clinicians’ judgments are conceptually complex and less than fully 
understood. Yet, at least in paradigm cases, clinicians clearly get the risk-
benefit evaluations of different treatment options right. For example, 
clinicians who care for unconscious patients in the emergency room are 
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often able to evaluate whether a given treatment, such as surgery for ap-
pendicitis, is or is not in their patients’ clinical interests.10 This suggests 
that reviewers should adopt an informed clinician’s perspective to deter-
mine whether individual research interventions pose, or do not pose, net 
risks. While the informed clinician’s perspective will not provide reviewers 
with an algorithm for making net-risk determinations, it explicitly sets a 
normative standard for how these determinations should be made.
Under the informed clinician test, reviewers should ask whether a fully 
informed clinician who is committed solely to promoting participants’ 
clinical interests would recommend that they undergo the intervention in 
question. If the clinician would recommend the intervention, it promotes 
participants’ clinical interests and thus does not pose net risks. This implies 
that the intervention’s risk-benefit profile is acceptable and—assuming 
the requirements of the previous steps are satisfied—needs no further 
evaluation.11 If the clinician would be indifferent, then undergoing the 
intervention neither undermines nor promotes participants’ clinical in-
terests. Provided that including the intervention in the study is necessary 
in order to gather valuable information (step 2), this suggests that it has 
an acceptable risk-benefit profile. If the clinician would advise against the 
intervention, then it poses net risks that require further evaluation (steps 6 
and 7). When applied to the liver cancer study, an informed clinician would 
not recommend that participants undergo the blood draws, CT scan, and 
liver biopsy, which—by stipulation—are performed for research purposes 
only. Thus, these interventions offer no potential clinical or health benefits 
for participants. depending on the available evidence from preclinical 
testing, an informed clinician might recommend, be indifferent toward, 
or advise against the investigational cancer drug.12 
Step 6: Evaluate Whether the Net Risks Are Justified  
by the Potential Benefits of Other Interventions
At this point, the review process has identified research interventions 
that pose net risks to participants and thus require further evaluation. The 
remaining two steps in the framework aim at assessing whether these net 
risks are acceptable. The net risks of some of these interventions might be 
justified by the potential clinical benefits of other interventions included in 
the same study. Some commentators reject this approach as representing 
a fallacy of the “package deal.” They argue that allowing the potential 
clinical benefits of one intervention to justify the risks of a different inter-
vention in the study might tempt investigators to add risky and unrelated 
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interventions to a protocol (Levine 1988; National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission 2001). If the risks of one intervention can be offset by the 
potential clinical benefits of other interventions in the same study, why 
not “fill up” the risks as much as the aggregate potential clinical benefits 
in the study allow? 
This scenario raises concern that a few individual participants might 
disproportionately bear the risks and burdens of biomedical research (a 
concern we address in step 2 when we ask reviewers to evaluate whether 
the research interventions contribute to addressing the main scientific 
question(s) posed by the study). Certainly it would be problematic for 
investigators to conduct the liver cancer study and require that partici-
pants undergo a brain biopsy unrelated to the research in question, simply 
because the potential clinical benefits of the investigational cancer drug 
are so substantial that they “leave room” for more risks in the study. Yet 
while aggregating risks and potential clinical benefits across unrelated 
research interventions is problematic for this reason, it is a very different 
matter to aggregate risks and potential clinical benefits across research 
interventions that stand in a relation of strict scientific necessity or unity 
(Friedman, Robbins, and Wendler 2010).
In the liver cancer study, we stipulated that an estimate of the hepatocel-
lular drug level is necessary to assess the investigational cancer drug, and 
it is possible that these data can be gathered only from a liver biopsy—and 
not, say, from a simple blood test. In this situation, the liver biopsy and 
the investigational drug form a single investigational unit: the drug must 
be either tested with the biopsy or it cannot be tested at all. Because these 
interventions form a single investigational unit, they can be treated as 
such in risk-benefit evaluations.13 In this case, investigators are not merely 
adding in the biopsy to take advantage of a captive population. Rather, 
the study makes sense only with the biopsy included. Thus, if the drug’s 
potential clinical benefits outweigh the risks of the drug and the risks of 
the biopsy together, the “package” of both interventions would pose no 
net risks to participants. This case of scientific necessity or unity provides 
one instance in which aggregating the risks and potential clinical benefits 
across interventions is not fallacious.
Importantly, this constrained approach to aggregating risks and poten-
tial clinical benefits across interventions precludes the possibility that risky 
and unrelated research procedures can be added to the protocol at will. 
At the same time, the approach helps to distinguish research risks that are 
justified by the potential clinical benefits to participants from risks that 
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are justified solely by the potential benefit to future patients. As we have 
pointed out, this is one of the most critical steps in evaluating the risks 
and potential benefits of biomedical research studies.14
Reviewers face two challenges when evaluating the risk-benefit profile of 
units of interventions. The first challenge is to determine whether a given set 
of interventions stands in a relation of scientific necessity or unity. Making 
this determination requires significant knowledge and expertise regarding 
scientific method. In particular, it can be difficult to judge whether there 
really is no alternative, less risky way to make a valid assessment of the 
given diagnostic or therapeutic research intervention. This judgment is 
relatively straightforward when the procedures under consideration pose 
low risks (e.g., a blood draw); it is often hard to find a research interven-
tion that poses lower risks than those procedures under consideration. It 
is more difficult to judge whether a high-risk procedure, such as the liver 
biopsy in the liver cancer study, is strictly necessary to evaluate the safety 
and/or efficacy of some investigational intervention. 
The second challenge is to evaluate whether a unit of scientifically 
necessary interventions poses net risks. This can require weighing a sig-
nificant number of risks and potential clinical benefits against each other. 
In principle, however, there is no difference between evaluating whether 
a unit of scientifically necessary interventions poses net risks and making 
this evaluation about a single research intervention. Both judgments aim 
to determine whether undergoing an intervention, or a set of interventions, 
conflicts with participants’ clinical or health interests. Reviewers should 
therefore repeat the informed clinician test in application to the investiga-
tional unit of scientifically necessary interventions and ask whether a fully 
informed clinician who is committed solely to promoting participants’ 
clinical or health interests would recommend that they undergo the unit 
of interventions in question. If the clinician would recommend the unit of 
interventions, then the potential clinical benefits of the “beneficial” inter-
vention in the unit outweigh that intervention’s own risks, as well as the 
net risks of the intervention(s) that are scientifically necessary for testing it 
(even though some of the interventions that make up the unit pose net risks 
on their own). This implies that the unit of interventions poses no net risks 
to participants and thus has an acceptable risk-benefit profile. Assuming 
the requirements of the previous steps are satisfied, the risks and potential 
benefits of the interventions in the unit require no further evaluation. Of 
course, any net-risk interventions in the study that are not part of the unit 
of scientifically necessary interventions under consideration need to be 
further evaluated (step 7).
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If the clinician would be indifferent towards the unit of interventions, 
undergoing it neither hinders nor promotes participants’ clinical or health 
interests. Provided that the interventions in the unit stand in a relation of 
strict scientific necessity or unity and that including them in the study is 
necessary to gather valuable information (confirmed in step 2), this sug-
gests that the unit of interventions has an acceptable risk-benefit profile. 
If the clinician would advise against the unit of interventions, the poten-
tial clinical benefits do not justify the risks. In this case, the unit poses 
“excess” net risks to participants that need to be further evaluated (step 
7).15 In relation to the liver cancer study, we stipulated it seems reason-
able to assume that the efficacy of the investigational cancer drug cannot 
be evaluated without the blood draws, the CT scan, and the liver biopsy. 
depending on the available preclinical data about the drug’s potential 
clinical benefits, an informed clinician might recommend, be indifferent 
toward, or advise against undergoing the unit of the investigational drug, 
blood draws, CT scan and liver biopsy.
Step 7: Evaluate Whether the Remaining Net  
Risks Are Justified by the Study’s Social Value
The seventh step is to evaluate whether any remaining net risks in the 
study—risks that are not justified by potential clinical benefits to sub-
jects—are justified by the potential social value of the knowledge to be 
gained from the research. To make this evaluation, it is useful to proceed 
in three steps. Reviewers first should determine the level of “cumulative” 
net risk in the study by adding any absolute, relative, indirect, and excess 
net risks that have been identified in the analysis thus far. Second, review-
ers should determine whether the study’s cumulative net risks fall within 
the general range of acceptable net risk in biomedical research studies. 
Arguably, there are levels of net risks to individual participants that cannot 
be justified by even tremendous social value. If the cumulative net risks 
in the study clearly exceed the general limits of acceptable research risk, 
the study should be rejected.16 If the cumulative net risks fall within the 
range of acceptable net risk, reviewers should evaluate, third, whether the 
given level of cumulative net risk is proportionate to the social value of 
the knowledge to be gained from the research. 
Implementing these three steps poses several challenges. Estimating the 
level of net risk posed by individual interventions can be difficult. While 
the informed clinician test tells reviewers whether a research intervention 
or unit of interventions poses net risks, it does not tell them what level of 
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net risk is involved. It seems sensible to modify the informed clinician test 
such that the strength of the clinician’s opposition to an intervention serves 
as an indicator of the level of net risk posed by an intervention or unit of 
interventions. Yet reviewers should remember that clinicians are experts 
in evaluating whether a given intervention promotes patients’ clinical or 
health interests, not in evaluating to what extent an intervention conflicts 
with those interests.
Review committees also need to determine the total net risks based 
on the absolute, relative, and indirect net risks posed by the individual 
research interventions (step 5), as well as the excess net risks posed by any 
package(s) of interventions that are scientifically necessary to evaluating 
the intervention under study (step 6). For example, in the liver cancer 
study, reviewers must add excess net risks posed by the combination of the 
investigational drug, blood draws, CT scan, and liver biopsy (this assumes, 
as initially stipulated, that the latter three interventions are scientifically 
necessary for testing the investigational drug, and that the potential clini-
cal benefits of the investigational drug does not suffice to outweigh the 
risks of all of these interventions); and the indirect net risks that might 
result from a reduced efficacy of diuretics or other procedures provided 
as part of or in parallel to the study. Unfortunately, there currently is no 
systematic approach to making these calculations.17 Reviewers therefore 
need to rely on their judgment. To make these judgments as accurately 
as possible, reviewers should proceed under careful consideration of the 
available data. Moreover, they should focus on significant potential harms, 
such as experiencing a major hemorrhage from a liver biopsy, which are 
ethically more concerning than harms of lower magnitudes. At the same 
time, reviewers must consider the possibility that a high number of inter-
ventions involving mostly minor harms or “burdens” might pose overall 
considerable risks (e.g., a series of blood draws). Finally, reviewers should 
assess the possibility that the net risks of the different interventions have 
interactive effects. 
The next challenge is to determine whether a study’s cumulative net risks 
fall within the general range of acceptable net risk. Yet what defines that 
range remains controversial. There is widespread agreement that research 
risks must be strictly limited if informed consent from participants is not 
obtained (e.g., in research involving deception) or cannot be obtained (e.g., 
in research involving children or incapacitated adults). Most guidelines and 
regulations define the upper limit of acceptable risk in this context as “mini-
mal” risk.18 Yet, despite the widespread endorsement of the minimal risk 
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threshold, there is no widely agreed-on definition of minimal risk. The most 
prominent definitions hold that minimal risks should only result in a “very 
slight and temporary” impact on participants’ health (Council of Europe 
2005) or that minimal risks should be no greater than the risks of routine 
medical examinations (Council for International Organizations of Medical 
Sciences 2002) or the risks posed by activities of daily life (HHS 1991). 
All these definitions are problematic in some way. A risk of serious or 
lasting harm can be “minimal” if the likelihood is sufficiently low. For ex-
ample, a blood draw is widely—and arguably appropriately—considered 
a minimal risk procedure although it poses a very small risk of serious 
infection or permanent nerve damage. Some routine examinations (e.g., a 
colonoscopy in older adults) clearly pose more than minimal risks, while 
certain nonroutine procedures (e.g., Reiki) pose essentially no risks. And 
many daily life risks, such as the risks of home accidents, are unacceptably 
high. We should thus not use them as a standard for acceptable research risk. 
In addition, the risks of routine clinical examinations and daily life activities 
are dissimilar to net research risks because people mostly incur them for 
their own benefit rather than for the benefit of others. For these reasons, 
the minimal risk threshold, although widely endorsed, has been notoriously 
difficult to define and implement (Shah et al. 2004; Lenk et al. 2004). 
Even less clear is whether there should be upper limits of acceptable risk 
in research with competent consenting participants and, if so, how that 
limit should be defined (Miller and Joffe 2009). With the exception of the 
Nuremberg Code (Annas and Grodin 1992), most existing guidelines and 
regulations set no explicit upper limits to risks in research with compe-
tent adults, provided the risks are reasonable in relation to the potential 
social benefits of the research.19 To be sure, despite the absence of explicit 
regulatory guidance, the vast majority of IRBs/RECs probably would not 
approve research studies that involve a high risk of death or serious injury. 
Moreover, the fact that the public has had strongly negative responses to 
deaths or severe adverse events in studies that offered no potential clini-
cal benefits for participants—for example, to the death of Ellen Roche, a 
healthy volunteer in a study investigating the pathophysiology of asthma 
(Steinbrook 2002), and to the drastic immune response of several healthy 
subjects in the phase 1 TeGenero trial (Suntharalingam et al. 2006)—sug-
gests that many people would endorse absolute upper limits of acceptable 
research risk.20 It also seems that no morally serious person would think 
it permissible to kill someone purely for research purposes, even if inves-
tigators had obtained highly scrutinized voluntary and informed consent 
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and the research had tremendous public health value—for example, by 
evaluating a very promising strategy for curing HIV/AIdS. All this suggests 
that there are upper limits on acceptable research risk, even in the context 
of highly scrutinized informed and voluntary consent.21 Yet exactly what 
justifies and what defines these upper risk limits remains an open question. 
The historical example of Walter Reed’s yellow fever experiments, which 
exposed healthy volunteers to a risk of developing a serious disease with 
an estimated mortality risk of 10 to 60 percent at the time (Lederer 2009), 
was probably pushing the limit. Even considering that yellow fever was a 
dire public health threat when the study was conducted—described as the 
“scourge of the American South” (Lederer 2009)—a 60 percent mortality 
risk for those who develop the disease seems likely beyond the absolute 
upper threshold of acceptable net risk in biomedical research, even when 
it involves fully competent adults who provide their fully informed and 
voluntary consent.
The main problem with delineating general risk limits in research is 
that doing so requires weighing net risks to individuals against potential 
benefits for society. What level of risk to the individual is acceptable for 
the benefit of others? Some commentators argue that it is impossible to 
make this judgment because the risks and potential benefits affect different 
people and thus allow for no trade-offs (Martin et al. 1995). However, 
while weighing individual risks against potential social benefits is difficult 
and raises profound philosophical questions (e.g., about the “separate-
ness” of persons [Rawls 1971]), essentially all policy decisions depend on 
making these judgments. For example, to decide whether a new highway 
should be built near an elementary school, city planners must weigh the 
potential benefits to commuters against the risks to the schoolchildren 
and set some upper limit of acceptable risk for the project. These judg-
ments are complex and less than fully understood. However, we do have 
clear normative ideals for how policy makers and public officials should 
approach such decisions: they should serve as “social arbiters” who (1) 
carefully consider the risks and potential benefits for all affected parties, 
ensuring that the risks to individuals are not excessive and proportion-
ate to the benefits to them and/or society, (2) give everyone’s claims fair 
consideration, and (3) treat like cases alike across different areas of policy. 
This suggests that reviewers should seek to adopt the perspective of an 
ideal social arbiter when considering upper limits of acceptable net risk.22 
To provide sufficient context for these deliberations, it is sensible to 
evaluate upper risk limits in research in comparison to the risks posed by 
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nonresearch activities. For example, to determine whether the cumula-
tive net risks in the liver cancer study fall within the range of acceptable 
research risk, it can be helpful to judge the 160–733 per 100,000 risk 
of serious hemorrhage from a liver biopsy in comparison to the risk of 
serious injury from playing a game of soccer for a charity fund-raiser or 
providing emergency assistance.23 Importantly, for risk comparisons to 
be valid, reviewers must choose comparator activities that are relevantly 
similar to research and widely considered to be acceptable for the given 
population. From an ethical perspective, one of the key characteristics of 
research that poses net risks is that it entails assuming risks for the benefit 
of others. Comparator activities need to be similar in this respect. For ex-
ample, charitable participation is relevantly similar and widely considered 
to be acceptable, even for children. To evaluate upper limits of acceptable 
net risk in pediatric research, reviewers might therefore use as a baseline 
the risks of acceptable charitable activities for children, such as a charity 
soccer game or car wash (Wendler 2005). The risks posed by live kidney 
donation (Miller and Joffe 2009) or emergency assistance (London 2006), 
riskier forms of acceptable “charitable participation” for adults, might 
be used to establish upper risk limits for research with competent adults. 
For example, reviewers might consider whether a liver biopsy in a healthy 
competent adult is more risky or less risky than donating a kidney.
Finally, the reviewers must judge whether the level of cumulative net 
risk in a study is proportionate to the study’s social value (a determina-
tion that is always made within the constraints of the general limits of 
acceptable net risk). Yet it remains unclear exactly how these judgments 
should be made. Reviewers can and should adopt the perspective of the 
ideal social arbiter. Under the idea social arbiter test, they should ask 
whether a fully informed and impartial social arbiter would recommend 
the study in question. For example, would the social arbiter recommend 
the liver cancer study? If the arbiter would positively endorse the study, 
the value of the information to be gained from the study justifies the cu-
mulative net risks to participants. If the arbiter would oppose the study, 
its social value does not justify the cumulative net risks, and the study 
should not be conducted. If the social arbiter would be indifferent, this 
equally suggests that the study should not be pursued.24 Admittedly, the 
ideal social arbiter test provides less precise guidance than the informed 
clinician test in steps 5 and 6. In particular, the idea that the social arbiter 
gives everyone’s claims “fair” consideration requires specification. Yet, as 
further work on these issues is being conducted, the ideal social arbiter 
rid and Wendler • a FrameWork For risk-BeneFit evaluations
[  167  ]
test supplies explicit, albeit general, normative standards for weighing 
individual net risks against potential social benefits. 
A further difficulty relates to the legitimacy of making judgments about 
the proportionality between individual net risk and potential social ben-
efit. As the cumulative net risks of a study increase, greater social value 
is required to justify them—up to the upper limit where net risks cannot 
be justified, however great a study’s social value. While step 1 of this 
framework requires making no more than a threshold judgment about 
social value—ensuring that the study is valuable enough to merit exposing 
participants to any research risks—step 7 calls for judging the magnitude 
of a study’s social value in relation to the cumulative net risks to partici-
pants. When the net risks to participants increase, reasonable people are 
likely to disagree about these judgments. 
For example, some people might find the liver cancer study sufficiently 
valuable to justify its cumulative net risks because liver cancer is a serious 
condition that affects some of the worst-off patients and the available 
treatment options are limited. Other people will disagree with this verdict, 
arguing that the study is not important enough to justify the significant 
level of cumulative net risk. While reviewers have a mandate to ensure that 
the risks to participants are acceptable and proportionate to the study’s 
social value, regular IRBs/RECs are not representative and transparent 
enough to serve as legitimate arbiters of reasonable disagreement. Review-
ers should therefore recognize that the evaluation of studies involving high 
cumulative net risks requires a higher level of scrutiny and accountability 
than regular risk-benefit evaluations.25 For example, were Walter Reed’s 
yellow fever experiments to be conducted today, the protocol probably 
should undergo review by an interdisciplinary committee of national or 
international experts, whose opinion would be subject to extensive public 
input. The final opinion, as well as the rationale underlying it, probably 
should be made publicly available as well.26 
BENEFITS OF THE FRAMEWORK
The proposed framework has two important benefits. The first benefit 
is practical. By offering systematic and comprehensive guidance for risk-
benefit evaluations, the framework should enhance both the accuracy and 
the consistency of risk-benefit evaluations and thereby help reviewers to 
strike the right balance between protecting subjects from excessive risks 
and allowing acceptable research to proceed. Given the fundamental 
importance of risk-benefit evaluations for ethical research, use of the 
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framework has the potential to improve the evaluation of research risks 
and benefits compared to current practice. Rather than rely on intuition 
alone, investigators, sponsors, IRB/REC members, and others can follow 
guidance that acknowledges the crucial role of intuition and normative 
judgment in risk-benefit evaluations but that at the same time clarifies 
when and how intuition comes into play. The framework also calls atten-
tion to the key challenges associated with each step of analysis and offers 
possible ways to address them.
The framework’s second benefit is conceptual. By offering a structure 
for systematic and comprehensive risk-benefit evaluations, the framework 
allows scholars to identify and better situate unsolved questions regard-
ing risk-benefit evaluations in research. This helps to set the agenda for 
future research. For example, as we mentioned, an open question regarding 
step 4 of the proposed framework is whether the potential psychological, 
social, and economic benefits of participants should be considered in risk-
benefit evaluations. It also is apparent that the fundamental first step of 
risk-benefit evaluations, which is to determine that a study will achieve 
at least a minimum level of social value, poses unsolved questions. What 
constitutes “socially valuable” research? Is scientific value a sufficient 
condition for social value? If not, what other conditions must be met for 
a study to offer the necessary minimum of social value? Step 7 likewise 
gives rise to a host of open questions. What justifies and defines upper 
limits of acceptable research risk? How can defensible definitions of upper 
risk limits be implemented? And how does “higher” social value justify 
higher risks to participants (up to the upper risk limit)? All these questions 
remain within the traditional focus of risk-benefit evaluations, which is on 
weighing risks to participants against the potential benefits to them and/
or the potential social benefits of the research. However, the framework 
also makes clear that truly comprehensive risk-benefit evaluations must 
consider social risks from the research (Selgelid 2007, 2009; Green et 
al. 2006), as well as risks to third parties (Hausman 2007; Kimmelman 
2005; Resnik and Sharp 2006). What should be done when it is possible 
that research results may be abused (e.g., in research on bioterrorism) and 
thus have potential “negative” social value? What should be done when 
the conduct of research exposes third parties to risks (e.g., in challenge 
studies with infectious diseases)? The proposed framework provides a 
clear structure for identifying and situating these open questions about 
risk-benefit evaluations. 
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CONCLUSION
Risk-benefit evaluations in biomedical research are critically important 
for protecting research participants from excessive research risks while 
allowing important research with acceptable risk to proceed. Based on 
current guidelines and regulations, as well as the available literature on 
risk-benefit assessment, the present paper delineates a comprehensive 
framework for risk-benefit evaluations to achieve these goals. The proposed 
framework provides a structure for making systematic and comprehensive 
risk-benefit evaluations, as well as for identifying unsolved challenges in 
evaluating research risks and potential benefits. Investigators, sponsors, 
and IRBs/RECs should use this framework to ensure that the risks to 
participants are not excessive in relation to the potential benefits from 
biomedical research studies. Scholars in bioethics should use it to struc-
ture their efforts of addressing the unsolved conceptual and normative 
challenges regarding one of the fundamental questions in research ethics.
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NOTES
1. Unless noted otherwise, our analysis is based on the ethical guidance docu-
ments and research regulations we cite here. 
2. One could argue that it would be more rigorous to distinguish these different 
aspects of risk-benefit evaluations and the different normative justifications 
underlying them from one another. While that approach is a prerequisite for 
careful conceptual and normative analysis, we adopt a practical perspective 
here. Our goal is to delineate practicable guidance for risk-benefit evalua-
tions that allows investigators, sponsors, IRB/REC members, and others to 
systematically address all aspects related to evaluating the risks and potential 
benefits of biomedical research studies. 
3. In some cases, it might be important to make comparative judgments about 
the social value of different study options. For example, the subject pool for 
research on very rare diseases is limited. In this situation, reviewers might 
want to consider what research to conduct, particularly when different study 
options are mutually exclusive. Is the social value of the proposed study com-
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parable to other study options that address related questions? The need to 
make judgments about the magnitude of a study’s social value and whether 
it is sufficient to justify the given level of net risk to participants, is addressed 
in step 7 of the framework. 
4. For a detailed exposition of this critique of “component analysis” and related 
approaches to risk-benefit assessment, see Wendler and Miller 2007.
5. Existing guidelines and regulations typically require that the risks to partici-
pants must be “minimized.” However, this requirement would prohibit most 
biomedical research: the safest way of minimizing the risks to participants is 
to stop conducting research altogether. We therefore prefer the formulation 
that the risks to participants should be “reasonably reduced.” 
6. In some cases, one might assume that risks themselves are of normative sig-
nificance. For example, individuals often experience stress or anxiety as the 
result of knowing that they face a risk of serious harm. This is of particular 
concern in the context of biomedical research, where strong emphasis is 
placed on ensuring that subjects are aware of the risks that participation in 
research poses to them. However, in these cases, it is the harm of anxiety or 
stress that is of normative concern, not the fact of facing the risks per se.
7. This point may seem trivial, but existing regulations and guidelines often fail 
to specify that the likelihood of clinical benefits and their potential magni-
tude must be carefully evaluated. For example, the declaration of Helsinki 
allows more than minimal risk research in participants who cannot give fully 
informed consent, provided that the research offers “a likelihood of benefit 
for them” (World Medical Association 2008). However, a mere likelihood of 
benefit may not be sufficient to justify more than minimal research risks in 
this population. For example, a very low likelihood of a small benefit, such 
as a 1 per 100,000 chance of not catching a cold, would probably not justify 
more than minimal risks. Thus, the careful evaluation of the potential clini-
cal benefits of research interventions is a prerequisite for sound risk-benefit 
evaluations.
8. This statement is made solely from the perspective of risk-benefit evaluations. 
Interventions that promote participants’ clinical or health interests and allow 
investigators to gather generalizable knowledge might raise other reasons 
for concern. For example, mutually advantageous (“win-win”) transactions 
can be exploitative, which is a particular worry in research in developing 
countries (Hawkins and Emanuel 2008). 
9. Relative net-risk judgments can become very complex in the context of in-
ternational research, where questions related to determining the appropriate 
standard of care have been controversial. For example, while the declara-
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tion of Helsinki would make testing research interventions against the “best 
current proven intervention” the default (World Medical Association 2008), 
many commentators defend conceptions of the standard of care that entail 
less than the worldwide best treatment (e.g. London 2000; Wendler, Emanuel, 
and Lie 2004). Unfortunately, a discussion of how these issues relate to rela-
tive net-risk determinations is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
10. Of course, physicians sometimes get these judgments wrong as well. Yet the 
possibility of mistakes is further evidence that risks and potential benefits 
can be compared at some level. 
11. We wish to reemphasize our initial statement that the proposed framework 
for risk-benefit evaluations is one part of a broader ethical framework for 
biomedical research. Thus, the judgment that the risk-benefit profile of a given 
intervention is acceptable does not imply that the study of which it is part is 
acceptable. Further ethical requirements for biomedical research (Emanuel, 
Wendler, and Grady 2000) must be met to justify the judgment that the study 
as a whole is acceptable. 
12. Two points of clarification about the informed clinician test. First, the test 
might seem to resemble the requirement of “clinical equipoise” that plays a 
central role in some approaches to risk-benefit assessment (Weijer and Miller 
2004; London 2007). Clinical equipoise is the “honest, professional disagree-
ment among expert clinicians” regarding which of one or more treatments, 
including investigational drugs, is to be preferred from the point of view of 
prospective study participants (Freedman 1987, 144). The informed clini-
cian makes a similar judgment when she determines whether the individual 
research interventions in a study are likely to promote (or not to promote) 
participants’ interests. Furthermore, the informed clinician makes her judg-
ment by taking expert opinion into consideration. Yet, the key difference 
between the framework for risk-benefit evaluations we propose here and the 
alternative approaches to risk-benefit assessment we have cited (Weijer 2000; 
Weijer and Miller 2004; London 2007) is the normative status they attribute 
to the informed clinician test and the equipoise requirement, respectively. 
Alternative approaches regard clinical equipoise as a necessary requirement 
for research interventions that offer a prospect of direct clinical benefit for 
participants. This implies that the risk-benefit profile of these “therapeutic” 
research interventions must be comparable to or better than the risk-benefit 
profile of existing alternative treatments, if there are any. The requirement of 
clinical equipoise thus has normative force: it disallows “therapeutic” research 
interventions that pose net risks and thus sets a threshold for acceptable net 
risks for these procedures. By contrast, the informed clinician test is merely 
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an indicator of net risk in all research interventions; it does not set any risk 
threshold. Thus, the informed clinician test does not rule out research interven-
tions that present net risks, including “therapeutic” procedures. The ethical 
acceptability of any net risks posed by research interventions is evaluated in 
steps 6 and 7 of the framework. 
  Second, the informed clinician test in its current formulation focuses on 
participant’s clinical interests. It might therefore be seen as excluding the 
evaluation of research interventions that have the potential to enhance hu-
man capabilities. However, we have refrained from discussing this scenario 
for reasons of clarity. Research on enhancement can have important social 
value, if, for example, it evaluates the risks and potential benefits of enhance-
ment interventions. Given her relevant knowledge (e.g., about physiology, 
pharmacology), an informed clinician should be able to judge participants’ 
“enhancement interests.” The informed clinician test could thus be modified 
for evaluating the risk-benefit profile of enhancement interventions. 
13. A more formal presentation of the relation of strict scientific necessity or 
unity to research interventions would be this. Research interventions stand 
in a relation of strict scientific necessity or unity if 1) it would be impossible 
to obtain a valid assessment of research intervention A without the inclusion 
in the study of interventions B, C, . . . , X, and 2) there is no alternative, less 
risky way to evaluate A other than by including B, C, . . . , X. Importantly, the 
relation of scientific necessity is transitive across interventions. If intervention 
B is necessary to evaluate intervention A, and B will provide the necessary 
information only if participants undergo intervention C, C would also qualify 
as scientifically necessary to evaluate the experimental intervention. For ex-
ample, a CT scan of the liver might be necessary to test the investigational 
cancer drug, but the scan can only yield valid data with a contrast agent. In 
this situation, both the CT scan and the contrast agent stand in a relation of 
scientific necessity or unity with the investigational drug for liver cancer.
14. One might expect that the constrained approach to aggregation is primar-
ily relevant for research with participants who cannot consent (Friedman, 
Robbins, and Wendler 2010), where net risks are strictly limited. Indeed, 
this is the context in which constrained aggregation probably has the most 
significant practical implications. For example, according to current regula-
tions and guidelines, the liver cancer study could not enroll patients who 
suffer from liver cancer as well as alcohol dementia because the liver biopsy 
clearly exceeds the level of acceptable “minimal” risk in this population. By 
contrast, the study could enroll these patients on the constrained aggregation 
view if the biopsy is scientifically necessary for testing the investigational liver 
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cancer drug and the potential clinical benefits of the drug outweigh the risks of 
both the drug and the biopsy. Nonetheless, constrained aggregation can have 
important implications for research with competent participants as well. By 
justifying part or all of the risks of net-risk interventions with the potential 
clinical benefits of another intervention in a study, constrained aggregation 
influences the level of net risk that needs to be justified by the social value 
of the study. For example, if the risks of the liver biopsy can be partially or 
fully justified by the potential clinical benefits of the investigational cancer 
drug, a lower level of “cumulative” net risks (see step 7) needs to be weighed 
against the potential social benefits of conducting the study. 
15. An alternative way of making these judgments would be to simply ask whether 
the aggregate potential clinical benefits in the package of scientifically neces-
sary interventions justify the aggregate risks of the package. However, we 
prefer the current formulation since it explicitly recognizes that one or more 
interventions in the investigational unit pose net risks to participants. 
16. This statement assumes that all measures to reasonably reduce the risks to 
participants have been taken (step 3) and that, by implication, the study 
cannot be further modified to reduce those risks.
17. To be precise, there currently is no method for adding net risks of one type 
or for adding net risks of different types. It would probably be feasible to 
cumulate pure absolute net risks by using a modified version of the SERR 
(systematic evaluations of research risks) method for implementing upper 
thresholds of acceptable research risk (Rid, Emanuel, and Wendler 2010). 
Roughly, this modified SERR approach might consist of the following steps: 1) 
decluster the pure (absolute) net risks into a complete list of potential harms 
and associated likelihoods; 2) classify the potential harms by magnitude us-
ing the SERR harm scale; and 3) add the likelihood estimates of all potential 
harms of the same magnitude. Yet this modification of SERR could only be 
used to cumulate pure absolute net risks. More work on how to determine 
the total level of net risk in a study is needed. 
18. U.S. federal regulations also allow a “minor increase over minimal” risk in 
certain pediatric research studies (HHS 1991). 
19. The Nuremberg Code, delivered as part of the Nuremberg military tribunals’ 
verdict on the Nazi concentration camp experiments, stipulates that “no 
experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe 
that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments 
where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects” (Annas and Grodin 
1992). This statement appropriately directs attention to the sometimes seri-
ous risks associated with research. However, it does not specify a likelihood 
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threshold for when a risk of serious injury is acceptable. After all, the mere 
presence of a risk of serious harm, such as a risk of death, does not make a 
research intervention unacceptable. It is only when the likelihood of death 
is sufficiently high that mortality risks become unacceptable. For example, 
a blood draw is one of the paradigm examples of a “minimal” risk research 
procedure, although it poses an exceedingly remote risk of death from infec-
tion.
20. A note of caution is warranted here. It seems likely that the negative public 
response to these cases rested on a common mistake in risk-benefit evalua-
tions, namely that of evaluating the risks and potential benefits of a study in 
hindsight. However, as Henry Beecher famously noted, “An experiment is 
ethical or not at its inception. It does not become ethical post hoc” (Beecher 
1966). Thus, the fact that a study seriously harmed some participants does 
not necessarily imply that the study exposed participants to excessive risk. 
Indeed, it is likely that some serious harms will eventually occur in the con-
text of acceptable research (that is, research with a very low risk of serious 
harm). Nonetheless, the strongly negative public response to serious injury 
or death—in particular in “nonbeneficial” research studies—lends support 
to the common intuition that net risks in research should be limited, even if 
this means that therefore some highly valuable research cannot be conducted. 
21. We recognize that more argument is needed to properly support this claim. 
The only paper dedicated to this question—to our knowledge—argues that 
the uncertainty of potential social benefit from any particular research study 
calls for prudence in exposing participants to substantial net risks (Miller and 
Joffe 2009). Yet this line of argument does not exclude exposing participants 
to very high risks if the potential social benefits of a given study are substantial 
and almost certain to be materialized. As we have mentioned, our own view 
is that risk-benefit evaluations must be grounded in, among other things, the 
need to ensure that societal gains in health and well-being are not secured at 
the cost of exploiting even competent participants who agree to be exploited. 
This view—which still awaits a full defense—would support limits to research 
risks even if a study is almost certain to yield results of tremendous public 
health benefit.
22. Thanks to Bob Goodin for suggesting this term.
23. Risk comparisons do not only provide a context for evaluating upper limits 
of acceptable net risk in research. They also promote consistent risk judg-
ments across activities in different realms of life (consistent with the ideal 
social arbiter perspective) and allow reviewers to appeal to risk judgments 
made outside the research context (Rid, Emanuel, and Wendler 2010).
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24. The ideal social arbiter test requires a positive endorsement of the study; 
indifference vis-à-vis the study is not sufficient for establishing an acceptable 
level of cumulative net risk. This test criterion reflects the conviction that 
reviewers should be certain that the study’s cumulative net risks are justified 
by the social value of the information to be gained rather than merely neutral 
on this question.
25. The following ideas about how to proceed in the case of reasonable disagree-
ment about risk-benefit evaluations are inspired by Norman daniels and 
James Sabin’s “accountability for reasonableness” approach to addressing 
reasonable disagreement regarding the allocation of scarce resources for 
medical care (daniels and Sabin, 1997). 
26. It is now apparent that the present framework for risk-benefit evaluations 
shares key features with the net-risks-test approach coauthored by one of us 
(david Wendler; see Wendler and Miller 2007). However, the present frame-
work differs from the net-risks test in at least three important ways. First, un-
like the net-risks test, it provides a comprehensive framework for risk-benefit 
evaluations that offers practicable guidance for investigators, sponsors, IRB/
REC members, and others. Second, the present framework allows for the 
constrained aggregation of risks and potential clinical benefits (step 5), which 
the net-risks test explicitly excludes (Wendler and Miller 2007). Third, unlike 
the net-risks test, the present framework does not evaluate the net risks of 
each individual intervention in relation to the social value of including that 
particular intervention in the study. Instead, it proceeds directly to weighing 
the cumulative net risks in the study against the social value of the information 
to be gained from the research. We now think it is difficult to judge the social 
value of including individual research interventions without considering the 
broader study context, and thus we proceed directly to evaluating a study’s 
cumulative net risks in light of its social value.
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